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Abstract. RFID-tags are very small and low-cost electronic devices
that can store some data. The most popular are passive tags that do not
have own power source, which allows for far-reaching miniaturization.
The primary use of RFID-tags is to replace barcodes. Their industrial
importance is constantly growing because in contrast to barcodes, man-
ual manipulation of the object code is not required. RFID-tags are also
used for detection and identiﬁcation of objects. This enables tracking of
objects in technological processes. At the moment, the most widespread
use of RFID tags is identiﬁcation of sold goods. However, the possibil-
ity of tracking carries the risk that improper subject can track the tags
and consequently track a person who is in possesion of tagged subject.
Therefore in this paper a method for tracking prevention is considered.
Keywords: Internet of Things · RFID · Privacy protection · Tracking
prevention
1 Introduction
Internet of Things (IoT) is the convergence of Internet with Radio Frequency
IDentification (RFID), Sensor and smart objects. IoT can be defined as “things
belonging to the Internet” to supply and access all of real-world information [13].
RFID is said to give rise to the IoT. RFID are systems that consist of three
fundamental elements: tags, reader and a database system. Tags (also called
transponders) are “small” electronic devices, highly constrained. They usually
do not have own power source and are inductively powered during communi-
cation with the reader. They are not capable to perform strong crypto opera-
tions (even symmetric encryption). Reader (transceiver) is a device with quite
big computational and energetic capabilities. Readers communicate with the
tags via radio channel. The last part of RFID system is a database that stores
information related with tags. Usually reader communicating with tags, uses a
database system.
Unfortunately, RFID technology entails some privacy threats. One of them
is tracking. For example, if a person is carrying an RFID-tag with static ID
with no encryption or blinding, then tracking is easy [4]. In this case tracking
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is understood as a possibility of identifying the tag. Another problem is that
authentication here does not help much, because it is generally used in order to
prevent revealing tag’s stored data [9]. Tag’s ID is usually not “masked”. Thus
learning tag’s ID is quite easily achievable and suﬃcient for tag tracking.
In this paper a method for tracking prevention is described. We propose that
tags has a dynamic ID. For this purpose, a tag should have built-in random
number generator. We assume that tag’s ID can be modiﬁed, for instance after
every tag activation. Then the tag generates new ID and sends it to the reader
which saves it in the system database. Considered is a passive model of an
adversary who eavesdrops all the traﬃc, but not all the time [10]. If the adversary
misses several changes of tag’s ID, it may be not possible to identify again
targeted tag. History of all tags IDs is stored in the backend database.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: next section gives a short
overview of methods for privacy preserving/tracking protection in RFID sys-
tems. Section 3 presents proposed method for tracking prevention. In Sect. 4
preliminary experimental evaluation of proposed method is presented; ﬁnally
the last section concludes this work and gives possible future directions.
2 Related Works
The risk associated with privacy has been recognized quite quickly [2]. Unfor-
tunately, some RFID systems do not use any security mechanisms, so tags can
be read by any reader, which is an obvious threat to privacy [12]. For instance,
an ability to identify a tag, can deliver information about its owner. It is then
possible to create a proﬁl of an user, based on information collected from tags
[7]. Thus so far many techniques for privacy protection have been proposed. In
[9], there is proposed a method for tracking prevention. Considered is a model,
where an attacker monitors a large fraction of interactions, but not all of them.
Authors propose to make small changes with the tag’s identiﬁer. Tag does not
have to perform any cryptographic functions.
Another method is “masking” tags, described in [4,14]. It assumes that a tag
stores a list of pseudonyms p1, p2, . . . , pk and every now and then changes them.
An adversary would not know that for example pi and pj belong to the same tag,
therefore such approach can eﬀectively complicate recognizing a tag. However, if
an adversary intercepts tag’s list of pseudonyms, the whole idea is compromised.
Another question worth considering is how many pseudonyms should have store.
Should be taken into account that tag has strongly limited memory resources [4].
Popular method is the kill command which aim is to completely deactivate
a tag [12]. However this approach strongly reduces functionality of the system
[8]. Another possible solutions are: screening with Faraday Cage or physical
destruction of antenna or other parts of a tag [8]. More advanced solution is
called active jamming. It is based on actively broadcasting radio signals, what
disrupts actions of any reader. However, this approach requires extra device [11].
In [6] there is proposed an extension of method from [15], where tag can be
temporarily switched oﬀ and another tag is simulating tags of all possible IDs.
Hence a reader is not able to determine a tag which established a connection.
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Golle et al. proposed in [5] a method called universal re-encryption. This
solution is based on the classical scheme ElGamal which allows for re-encryption
of a ciphertext without knowledge about public key. Thereby computationally
powerful devices can read from a tag its content, then re-encrypt it and save it
back in the tag. In this case only tag’s owner, who knows the proper private key,
is able to track the tag. Further development of this idea was proposed in [1].
3 A Method for Tracking Prevention
3.1 System and Privacy Model
We assume that RFID system consists of several tags, a reader and the backend
database. More formal deﬁnition is presented in Deﬁnition 1.
Definition 1 (RFID system). Let S denote RFID system. S consists of
reader R, finite set of i tags (transponders) T = {T1, T2, . . . , Ti} and database
DB which stores information related with the tags. DB also stores for each tag
ID = {ID1, ID2, . . . IDn} which is the history of all tags’ IDs. IDn is defined
as history of IDs of tag’s n: IDn = {ID1n, ID2n, . . . , IDkn}, where IDkn is the k-th
ID of the n-th tag.
It is assumed that tags are passive (powered only during the communication
with the reader).
In Deﬁnition 2 we introduce a simple model of an adversary and his goals.
We deﬁne adversary’s goal similarly as in the scheme proposed in [3]. A passive
adversary A eavesdrops all the communication between RFID system compo-
nents (i.e. the forward and backward channel), but not all the time.
Definition 2 (Adversary’s goal – unlinkability game). Suppose that there
exists list of n tags IDs: ID = {ID1, ID2, . . . IDn}, where IDn is defined as in
Definition 1. Then, it is choosed IDkx ∈ ID which is the currently used ID of
some tag Tx ∈ T . The goal of the adversary is to guess x with the probability
greater than 1n .
In our approach we assume that adversary observing the communication
between reader and a tag, can “miss” several queries. The goal of the adversary
is to identify the tag, i.e. not to “lose” its ID.
3.2 Tracking Prevention
We propose a method ChangeID which can be used to make more diﬃcult recog-
nition a particular tag. This method assumes that a tag simply changes its own
identiﬁer by generating a new one. Then, a new ID is transferred to the reader
which saves it in the backend database. This makes possible later identifying the
tag. Below is presented an idea of method ChangeID.
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1. Tag has a n-bit binary sequence which stands for its ID: (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ {0, 1}n;
2. Next n bits are overwritten at random: a new sequence is created (bi1 , . . . , bin),
where for all j ≤ n, bij ← b ∈U {0, 1} is substituted from a uniform distribu-
tion.
This procedure can be performed after each activation of tag or, for instance
at speciﬁed intervals. Note that none of sensitive data is transferred through the
forward channel which is assumed to be easily eavesdropped [11,15]. It is likely
that at average n/2 bits could remain unchanged.
Formally, this approach can be described as Algorithm1.
ChangeID
Input: (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ {0, 1}n
Output: (bi1 , . . . , bin)
for j ≤ n do
bij ← b ∈U {0, 1}
end
Algorithm 1: ChangeID procedure
Note that this procedure has low requirements in terms of computational
complexity.
3.3 Problem of Ambiguity
One should consider that generating random IDs may cause generation of two (or
more) the same IDs. Such a situation is undesirable in most systems and some-
times can be critical to their functioning. Although intuitively the probability of
happening such situation is quite small, one can assume that the reader (after
each changing tag’s ID) checks in the backend database, if generated ID already
exists. If does, then tag simply could be asked to perform another ChangeID oper-
ation. Similarly, if new generated ID is the same as the previous one, another
performance of ChangeID could be done. In this case we assume that considered
is a sequential access model. This situation is presented in Table 1.
4 Preliminary Experimental Evaluation
We conducted a simple experiment in which we implemented a function generat-
ing diﬀerent lengths random sequences (strings) that could act as a tag identiﬁer.
We checked the possible links between distances of these sequences and examined
Hamming distances between them.
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if s exists in DB then
query for another ChangeID
else save s
We divided an experiment into 5 trials, in each trial 80 sequences of the
following lengths were generated:
1. 32 bits length;
2. 64 bits length;
3. 128 bits length;
4. 256 bits length;
5. 512 bits length.
We analyzed Hamming distances between sequences in each trial (for exam-
ple, sequence (1) with sequence (2); (2) with (3), ...). For the clarity, we normal-
ized results of Hamming distance on the interval [0, 1].
4.1 Distances in 32 Bits Trial
In Fig. 1 there are presented distances between adjacent sequences in 32-bits
trial. Similarity is mostly at the level 0.7–0.9.
Fig. 1. Distances between adjacent sequences (total number of sequences: 80)
On the X-axis the are next sequences; Y -axis presents the normalized dis-
tance between adjacent sequences.
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Table 2. Fragment of generated sequences for 32 bits trial
Generated sequence Hd Norm
(1) 11011111001011011001010011001010
(2) 10111100010110011100111100110100 21 0.66
(3) 10100010100111001110100010010111 27 0.84
(4) 11010100000100011111101000001101 18 0.56
(5) 11111010000100001100111000001010 21 0.66
(6) 11111110000100111000010011000011 22 0.69
(7) 10111010000010001011000000100011 28 0.88
(8) 11001000101011011101011110100000 25 0.78
(9) 11000010000100010110110110101111 27 0.84
. . . . . .
(79) 101110100010001110001100011111010
(80) 111000101010010111011011001110000 23 0.72
In Table 2 there are presented several generated sequences and distances
between adjacent sequences. Hd for i-th sequence stands for Hamming distance
between the i−1 and i sequence, Norm denotes value of normalization at [0, 1].
For instance, Hd between (1) and (2) equals 21; in normalized way: 0.66, and so
on.
For the clarity, we do not present full results of this and the other trials.
4.2 Summary
The Table 3 shows minimum and maximum values of normalized at [0, 1] dis-
tances in each trial.
Table 3. Minimum and maximum values of distances between sequences within each
trial
32 bits 64 bits 128 bits 256 bits 512 bits
Min 0.38 0.48 0.61 0.71 0.76
Max 1 1 0.97 0.92 0.88
Intuitively, the shortest sequence, the higher probability for generating two
quite similar sequences (minimum distance for 32 bits is 0.38, for 64 bits –
0.48). The longer sequence, the greater diﬀerences (for instance, 0.76 for 512
bits sequences). These results are also showed in Figs. 2 and 3, respectively.
The longer tag’s ID, the smaller probability of generating two the same
sequences; however longer sequence requires more tag’s memory.
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Fig. 2. The minimum (normalized) Hamming distance within each trials
Fig. 3. The maximum normalized Hamming distance within each trials
5 Conclusion and Future Works
In this paper, a method for tracking prevention for RFID-tags was proposed. It
was assumed that tag is able to change its own identiﬁer by generating a random
sequence and replacing earlier ID. If an adversary is not able to monitor the tag
all the time, this method after a certain amount of execution can eﬀectively
complicate recognition of the tag. Preliminary experimental evaluation showed
that unlinkability between tags IDs is at satisfactory level.
If future works it is planned to give a formal estimation of minimal number
of ID modiﬁcation in order to achieve good level of privacy. Also a simulation
of implementation is considered to be carried out. Another problem to consider
is to propose a method for settlement of the ambiguity of tags’ IDs not in the
sequential access model but in situation of independent and parallel operations
of (several) readers.
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Open Access. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Com-
mons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
4.0/), which permits use, duplication, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any
medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and
the source, a link is provided to the Creative Commons license and any changes made
are indicated.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work’s
Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such mate-
rial is not included in the work’s Creative Commons license and the respective action
is not permitted by statutory regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the
license holder to duplicate, adapt or reproduce the material.
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